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Abstract 
Personalization is an integral part of e-commerce strategy today.  A unique feature of 
personalization is that it requires users to provide a certain amount of personal information to the service 
provider, thus giving rise to an interesting dilemma in that consumers cannot enjoy more personalized 
services without sacrificing more privacy.  In this paper, we propose a mechanism that allows an online 
personalization vendor to provide proper incentives for consumers to share information, while protecting 
their privacy at the same time.  The proposed solution not only enables consumers and the firm to engage 
in an otherwise unviable market, but it also allows the firm to implement an incentive-compatible menu 
that serves all consumers regardless of their privacy sensitivity.  Further, we demonstrate that a minimum 
privacy-preservation policy is an effective device for protecting consumers’ online privacy, and that it 
outperforms restricting vendors’ ability in collecting customer information. 
Our proposed mechanism is of theoretical and practical importance: By transforming the 
compensation schedule (privacy preservation) into a set-compliment device to the production variable, our 
approach offers an alternative to the reliance on external transfer, thus eradicating a major constraint 
confronted by traditional mechanism design. Practically, our research proposes a realistic, easily-
implementable solution to the fervent calls for endowing consumers with greater control over their online 
privacy.  Further, it offers important policy guidelines to the regulator on not only what devices can be 
applied in governing the information practice of online vendors, but also exactly how social-efficiency can be 
enhanced. 
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1. Introduction 
Personalization is an integral part of e-commerce strategy today.  Web portals and online vendors 
offer a variety of personalization that ranges from browser helper objects (BHO) such as toolbars, to 
personalized recommendations, content deliveries, and search results (Hosanagar et al. 2008). Two 
prominent examples in web-based personalization are Amazon.com and Google.  Amazon devotes over 
$200 million a year on investments in information technologies, of which a significant portion is dedicated 
for customer relationship management (CRM) and providing personalized offerings and recommendations 
through analyzing customer data.  Google derives over 95% of their revenues from pure text-based 
advertisements, which are tailored to its users based on the specific queries that are submitted to Google’s 
search engine.  It also offers a variety of personalized services such as Google toolbar, Google Reader, and 
iGoogle.  Recently, Google has expanded its venture to a new domain through the launch of Google Health, 
a web-based application that provides personalized health information management tool to its users.   
Interestingly, even though the provision of personalization implies significant investments in 
technologies and infrastructures, most of these online services are provided free of charge to the consumers.  
The primary sources of revenue for vendors come typically not from charging for personalized services, but 
from the information that consumers divulge through the usage of these services.  By assembling data from 
and forming detail profiles of their customers, firms can help third-party advertisers serve ads to the desired 
customer segments or use this information to launch their own targeted advertisements (e.g. Google, MSN, 
Yahoo!), share information with apps developers and claim part of their revenues (e.g. Apple and 
Facebook), harness the collective intelligence to offer products and services that better match customers’ 
needs and induce repeat purchases (e.g. Amazon and Last.fm (Fleder and Hosanagar 2009)), or simply 
auction off the customer data (e.g. BlueKai (Steel 2009)).   
A unique feature of personalization is that users can enjoy more personalization only if they are 
willing to disclose more information about themselves.  For example, by entering a medical condition, a 
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Google Health user will be given reference links to learn about the symptoms, causes, and treatments about 
that particular condition.  However, if the user would also like to know about potential interactions 
between the drugs she is taking and the allergies or conditions from which she is suffering, then additional 
information such as details of her medical records and prescriptions will also need to be provided.  
Therefore, personalization gives rise to an interesting dilemma in that consumers need to trade-off between 
enjoying personalized services and sacrificing privacy (Chellappa and Sin 2005; Awad and Krishnan 2006).  
Since the  institutions gathering customer information also essentially “own” the information (Laudon 1996), 
consumers are often left with no control over how such information is used.  The notion of potential abuse 
may trigger severe privacy concerns that deter consumers from adopting the services being offered (hence 
providing the corresponding information that is vital to online personalization vendors), or cause them to 
simply withdraw completely from participating in the market.  Such dire consequences are exemplified in 
recent massive protests against Facebook’s intrusive information practice, where some Facebook users 
boycotted certain services while others terminated their accounts.  Therefore, privacy concerns may 
threaten not only the profitability of personalization providers, but also the very existence of the market 
itself.  Our goal is to devise a mechanism that helps vendors to provide proper incentives for consumers to 
share information while protecting their privacy at the same time, and examine the welfare implications of 
regulating the vendor’s information practice from a policy maker’s perspective. 
Our proposed mechanism is of theoretical and practical importance: Theoretically, we introduce 
information partition as a novel solution to the collapse in the number of available instruments that arises 
from the personalization-privacy tradeoff.  By transforming the compensation schedule (privacy 
preservation) into a set-compliment device to the production variable, our design offers an alternative to 
the reliance on external instruments (such as monetary transfer), thus eradicating a major constraint 
confronted by traditional mechanism design.  We demonstrate that not only does the optimal contract 
enable consumers and the firm to participate in an otherwise unviable market, but that by leaving 
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consumers full control on part of the information acquired from them, the firm is also able to implement an 
incentive-compatible menu that serves the entire market.   
Practically, our research proposes a realistic solution to the fervent calls for endowing consumers 
with greater control over their online privacy; interestingly, such voices are echoed not only among privacy 
advocates, but also the Internet giants including Google and Microsoft as well (Press 2008).  The proposed 
contract can be implemented through new industry standards, such as the Platform for Privacy 
Preferences (P3P) protocol, that help consumers manage their privacy online by allowing them partial 
control on how much and in what way their information can be collected and used by online vendors.  
Further, our work is one of the first that responds to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)’s initiatives in 
pursuing legislative options in protecting consumers’ online privacy (FTC 2009; News 2010).  Specifically, 
results from our welfare analysis offer important guidelines to the regulator on not only what devices can be 
applied in governing the information practice of online vendors, but more importantly, exactly how 
enhancements in social-efficiency can be achieved through a minimum privacy-preservation policy.  Our 
research has far-reaching implications, especially given the astonishing growth in the delivery of 
personalized digital contents for mobile devices that marks the inception of ubiquitous personalization in 
the digital era. 
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews relevant literature on personalization and 
mechanism design, which is followed by the development of the basic model in section 3.  In section 4, we 
examine vendor’s optimal strategy under asymmetric information, and discuss the welfare implications of 
alternative regulatory interventions.  Section 5 concludes the paper with discussions on theoretical and 
managerial implications of our work. 
2. Literature Review 
The first formal study on consumers’ tradeoffs between personalization and privacy in the online context 
was conducted by Chellappa and Sin (2005).  In their study, the authors empirically examine the respective 
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roles of consumers’ valuation of personalized services and the privacy costs associated with sharing personal 
information in their likelihood of adopting online personalization.  Their research establishes that values for 
personalization and concerns for privacy are two independent factors, yet they jointly determine a 
consumer’s decision to use personalized services.  Further, individuals may experience different levels of 
privacy concerns even in disclosing the same amount of information.  Such systematic differences in the 
preference for privacy, which is referred to as “privacy sensitivity” and is typically unobservable to a third-
party (Chellappa and Shivendu 2010), may be attributed to individuals defining information spaces of their 
social lives differently, being exposed to different situational cues and primed differently with the 
consequences, or placing different probabilities or values on a given outcome (Hann et al. 2007).  
Mechanism design has been recommended as a useful framework in studying the market for 
personal information, where firms can device a mechanism that allows consumers to “purchase” an ideal 
level of privacy (Rust et al. 2002; Murthi and Sarkar 2003).  Ever since the seminal works by Mussa and 
Rosen (1978) and Maskin and Riley (1984) on monopolistic nonlinear pricing, mechanism design has been 
applied to examine a broad variety of issues, such as governmental regulation of the private monopolist 
(Baron and Myerson 1982), procurement (Laffont and Tirole 1993), and duopolistic competition in 
horizontally and vertically differentiated markets (Rochet and Stole 2002).   In addition to the rich 
literature in economics on both theoretical development and applications of this framework, there has 
recently been a few applications in Information Systems on topics ranging from versioning and pricing of 
information goods (Sundararajan 2004; Huang and Sundararajan forthcoming 2011), to optimal sampling 
strategy and digital rights management (Sundararajan 2004).  In particular, Chellappa and Shivendu (2010) 
are among the first to embrace this approach in studying the market for personalization, where the amount 
and quality of personalization that can be offered to a customer is proportional to the amount of 
information that the firm has about her (Volokh 2000; Adomavicius and Tuzhilin 2002).  The authors 
propose couponing as a compensation instrument in designing a segmenting mechanism to address 
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consumers’ intrinsic privacy concerns associated with sharing personal information.  Despite the novelty of 
their modeling approach, the applicability of such side payments or monetary subsidies in the market for 
personalization is limited in practice.  The closest real-life examples are Amazon’s “A9 Instant Reward” and 
Microsoft’s “Bing cashback” programs 1
Although privacy is a complicated concept and has been termed many different definitions in the 
literatures of sociology, law, and political science (Solove 2008), in this research we shall focus on the 
informational aspect of privacy (Stone et al. 1983; Stone and Stone 1990), which is of utmost concern to 
online customers and is most relevant in the context of personalization (Culnan and Armstrong 1999).  
Specifically, we consider the loss of control over the outflow and subsequent usage of one’s own information 
as the source of privacy costs that arise from sharing personal information.  We propose “privacy 
preservation”, which involves granting consumers complete control over part of the information collected 
from them by the online vendor, as a solution to the personalization-privacy dilemma.  The idea that such 
preservation can moderate consumers’ privacy concern is supported by extant literature.  In particular, 
Hann et al. (2007) find that proper information handling and access procedures can mitigate privacy 
concerns and result in an increase in willingness to provide personal information.  Tsai et al. (forthcoming 
2011) suggest that individuals are willing to pay a premium for privacy once privacy information is made 
more prominent and intuitive.  Interestingly, even for mechanisms that are non-verifiable, such as privacy 
.  Unfortunately, both programs suffered similar fates in being 
discontinued within two years of their introduction (Turner and Wolfson 2010); most online vendors 
nowadays still rely primarily on offering personalized services as incentives for consumers to share 
information. 
                                                     
1 A9 Instant Reward was more popularly known as the “ / 2π  discount”, which offered monetary rewards 
to users of their browser-embedded toolbar that delivers personalized search results. This program was 
launched in 2004 and discontinued in 2006.  Bing cashback was launched in 2008 and discontinued in 
2010. 
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statements or seals, their presence still mitigates privacy concerns by helping consumers assess of the risks 
of disclosing personal information to websites (Milne and Culnan 2004; Hui et al. 2007).  These findings 
provide strong evidence that by delivering a sense of control over their own information, firms can manage 
consumers’ privacy concern and strategically leverage privacy protection for competitive advantages. 
3. Model 
We consider a market where consumers are heterogeneous in their privacy sensitivity, denoted by 
[ , ]θ θ θ∈ , such that consumers with higher values of θ  are more privacy sensitive.  We assume θ  to be 
private information to the consumers, and is distributed with density function ( )f θ  and cumulative 
density ( )F θ ; where ( )f θ  is continuously differentiable, everywhere positive, and log-concave on its 
support [ , ]θ θ .2
 A principal — an online portal or vendor — offers free personalization services that are considered 
valuable by the consumers.  Consumers provide personal information that is required to enjoy the 
corresponding personalized services.  Once this information (denoted by 
 
I ) is acquired and processed, a 
spectrum of personalized offerings is being generated in return. The value (also referred to as convenience 
hereafter) that a consumer derives from consuming these services (denoted by ( )S I ) is assumed to be 
positively correlated with the amount of information provided as well as the extent to which the vendor is 
                                                     
2 If ( )f θ  is continuously differentiable and log-concave, then it is single-peaked (uni-modal), and the 
reciprocal of its hazard rate, i.e.,
( )
( )
F
f
θ
θ
, is non-decreasing, satisfying the monotone hazard rate property. 
Most common distributions satisfy these standard assumptions (Bagnoli and Bergstrom 2005).  Further, 
with log-concavity of ( )f θ , ( )F θ  is also log-concave on [ , ]θ θ  (a standard proof is provided in the 
online appendix). 
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able to use such information in generating personalization.  For tractability, we use a linear function to 
capture this intrinsic relationship between convenience and information acquisition: 
 ( )S I aI=  (3.1) 
where the parameter a  captures the vendor’s technological efficiency in generating convenience for the 
consumers from their personal information.  This relationship is assumed to be deterministic, and is 
common knowledge to all parties in the market.  Similar treatments can be found in Chellappa and 
Shivendu (2010). 
 Consumers face the personalization-privacy dilemma documented in extant literature: one cannot 
enjoy more convenience (personalized services) without sacrificing more privacy (personal information).  
Hence, a consumer’s utility increases with amount of personalization consumed and decreases with the 
amount of personal information shared.  The following function captures this tradeoff: 
 ( ) ( ),U I S I Iθ θ= −  (3.2) 
Note that in the absence of a contract that protects consumers’ privacy, consumers have no control over 
the information that has been transferred to the vendor.  Hence the disutility that arises from a consumer’s 
privacy concern is assumed to be proportional to the full set of information provided to the vendor, scaled 
by her privacy sensitivity θ .   
 Given S aI= , equation (3.2) can be rewritten as a function of I ; i.e. ( ) ( ),U I a Iθ θ= − .  Hence 
a consumer’s decision on whether to subscribe to the proposed personalization services (or to “participate” 
in the market) depends on the relative magnitude of the efficiency coefficient a  against her type coefficient 
θ .  We label those consumers with aθ >  “privacy seekers”, as the costs of their privacy concerns outweigh 
the benefits derived from personalization so that they abstain from participating in the market; and those 
with aθ ≤  “convenience seekers”, as these consumers value convenience so much so that they are willing 
disclose as much information as possible in exchange for personalization.  It can be observed that when the 
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market comprises of only privacy seekers (i.e. aθ > ), no consumer is willing to participate given the 
negative utility associated with using any level of personalization.  In other words, the personalization 
market is unviable.  Our goal is to provide a solution under such circumstances by introducing the notion 
of privacy preservation.  
 Privacy preservation ( )η  is defined as the portion of I (the set of information acquired by the 
vendor) that is used purely for the purpose of generating personalization.  It is ex-ante contractible (e.g. 
through p3p or conventional privacy policies) and ex-post verifiable and enforceable (e.g. through auditing 
and government sanctions).  With the credible commitment that η  will not be subject to secondary use, 
consumers’ privacy concerns arise only from the disclosure of its complement ( )i .  Formally,  
 i I η= −  (3.3) 
 Hence under the preservation scheme, the utility that a consumer of type θ  derives upon adopting 
personalization is given by: 
 ( ) ( ), ,U SI I iθη θ = −  (3.4) 
3.1 Vendor’s objective  
 The online vendor generates revenue from the set of information over which it can explore 
commercial possibilities, and incurs a constant marginal cost3
 
 in converting the acquired information into 
personalized services to its consumers.  Without loss of generality, the marginal cost is normalized to 1.  
This normalization suggests that the magnitudes of other coefficients in our model are to be interpreted in 
a relative sense, rather than an absolute one.  The vendor’s profit from serving each consumer is defined as: 
( ), ( )I i Iπ η ϕ= −  (3.5) 
                                                     
3 This can be interpreted as a “resource cost” – the cost associated with the necessary computing resources 
in providing personalized content to a request (Liu et al. 2010). 
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where ( )iϕ  is the revenue-generating function of the vendor, and is assumed to be of the following form: 
 ( ) 21
2
i bi iϕ = −  (3.6) 
 b
+∈ in equation (3.6) denotes the commercial efficiency of the vendor’s personalization strategy; 
i.e. a larger b implies more effective use of consumers’ information in generating revenues.  The quadratic 
functional form is chosen for analytical convenience and is common in mechanism design literature (Rochet 
and Stole 2002; Yang and Ye 2008). 
 Due to information asymmetry of consumers’ privacy sensitivity ( )θ , the vendor’s problem is to 
design a direct mechanism of { } ,( ), ( )I θ θ θθ η θ  ∈   so that consumers of different types self-select into the 
desirable pair, allowing the vendor to maximize profit.  Formally, the vendor’s programme is: 
 
( ) ( )
( )
21( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )                    
2
. .   for each ,      arg max ( ) ( ( ) ( ))          (I.C.)
                               ( ) ( ) ( ) 0                   
b I I I f d
s t aI I
aI I
θ
θ
θ
θ η θ θ η θ θ θ θ
θ θ θ θ θ η θ
θ θ θ η θ
 − − − − 
 
= − −
− − ≥
∫

  
    (I.R.)
 (3.7) 
 Our model formulation is unique in that: 1) the two contracting variables in our model are additive 
separable, since our instruments are set-compliment (i.e. η is a subset of I )4
                                                     
4 Therefore, besides the participation and incentive compatibility constraints, an additional constraint 
; 2) the compensatory transfer 
is perceived differently by the principal and the agents; i.e. the principal’s cost of delivering services is not 
identical to the benefits received by the agent.  Despite these departures from the conventional mechanism 
design problem, our model is analogous to the traditional setup in two fundamental ways.  
( ) ( )I θ η θ≥ needs to be accounted for when evaluating the implementability of the contract.  Technical 
details are available from Lemma A1 in the Online Appendix. 
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 First, the contracting pair { }( ), ( )I θ η θ  satisfies the single-crossing property (i.e.
( )( )/ / 0IU Uηθ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ >  θ∀  in consumer’s utility ( )( ) ( ) ( )aI Iθ θ θ η θ− − ).  Hence local analysis is 
sufficient to ensure global incentive compatibility.  Second, both the production and compensation 
functions are separable and well-defined.  To see this, we can rewrite the vendor’s marginal gain from 
serving customers of type θ  as ( )21( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
bi i iθ θ θ η θ− − + (from equations (3.3) and (3.6)) and 
consumer’s utility as ( )( ) ( )a a iη θ θ θ− −  (from Equations (3.1) and (3.4)).  ( )i θ  can be interpreted as the 
production variable for both the principal and the agent, while ( )η θ  assumes the role of the compensation 
variable.  Under complete information, maximizing profit necessarily implies that the vendor keeps ( )η θ  at 
the lowest possible level, which is determined by the participation constraint ( )( ) ( ) 0a a iη θ θ θ− − ≥ .  For 
a given production level ( )i θ , the vendor acquires and processes extra information, defined by 
( )( ) ( )a i
a
θ
η θ θ
−
= ,  in order to offset the production cost ( ) ( )a iθ θ−  borne by the consumer. Hence the 
tradeoff faced by the vendor reduces to
( )21( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
a
bi i i i
a
θ
θ θ θ θ
− 
− − + 
 
, and that the compensation 
affects vendor’s decision on the optimal production level in a similar fashion as in traditional models.   
4. Analysis 
4.1 Optimality of the privacy-preserving contract 
In this section, we characterize the optimal contract that is composed of information acquisition and 
privacy preservation.  We show that the proposed information partition is not only incentive-compatible, 
but it also allows the vendor to fully separate the market.  We shall first present some preliminary results 
based on complete information before proceeding to the asymmetric information case. 
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Lemma 1. Under complete information, the optimal allocation { }* *( ), ( )I θ η θ  fulfills *( )I ba a
θ θθ  = − 
 
 
and 
( )*( ) a b
a a
θ θη θ
−  = − 
 
. 
All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.  We can observe from Lemma 1 that the production 
variable is given by * * *( ) ( ) ( )i I b
a
θθ θ η θ= − = − , which is decreasing in θ . This is consistent with the 
intuition that more efficient types (less privacy-sensitive consumers in our case) produce more (allow more 
information to be used for commercial purposes).  On the other hand, * '( ) 0I θ >  implies that more 
information is being extracted from more privacy-sensitive consumers.  While this result appears counter-
intuitive at the first glance, it should be noted that the preservation level also increases in θ , and that it 
increases at a faster rate compared to information acquisition (i.e. * *'( ) '( ) 0Iη θ θ> > ).  Together they 
suggest that more values are indeed being delivered to the highly privacy-sensitive consumers to ensure 
their participation; because an increasing portion of the additional information being gathered is used to 
generate personalized services for these consumers rather than revenues for the firm. 
The following lemma shows that under asymmetric information, the infinite incentive constraints 
reduce to a simple differential equation with a monotonicity condition.  This lemma helps us narrow down 
the search for an optimal profile among the implementable ones. 
Lemma 2: For aθ > , a piecewise 1C  incentive-compatible allocation { }( ), ( )I θ η θ satisfies / 0d dη θ ≤  
and ( ) 0dI da
d d
ηθ θ
θ θ
− + =  a.e. on [ , ]θ θ . 
Lemma 2 implies that production level decreases with consumers’ privacy sensitivity
 
0di a d
d a d
η
θ θ θ
 = ≤ − 
, which is analogous to the monotonicity condition in standard mechanism design 
problems.  Since reporting a higher θ  than their actual type allows consumers to enjoy a saving in 
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production cost, incentive compatibility of the objective menu requires that the preservation level be lower 
for more privacy-sensitive consumers: the vendor associates a 
a
a
θ −
 decrease in preservation level with a 
marginal decrease in production level; together they result in a reduction in the level of information 
acquisition by 
a
θ
.  These dynamics are being captured by the differential equation.  Hence, contrary to the 
complete information case presented in Lemma 1, both information acquisition and privacy preservation 
are non-increasing in consumer’s privacy sensitivity.   
Having established Lemma 2, we can now formally characterize the optimal implementable menu 
in the following proposition. 
Proposition 1.  The optimal allocation { }( ), ( )I θ η θ   is fully-separating, and is characterized by the 
following system of equations: 
( )1 1 ( ) 1 ( )( )
( ) ( )
1 1 ( ) 1 ( )( )
( ) ( )
F F va b b v dv
a a f a f v
F F vI b b v dv
a a f a f v
θ
θ
θ
θ
θη θ θ θ
θ
θθ θ θ
θ
         = − − + + − +        
         

         = − + + − +       
        
∫
∫


 
on [ , ]θ θ . 
 We can observe from Proposition 1 that a unique contract-pair is being offered to consumers of 
each type (full separation).  Further, the production level delegated to a consumer of type θ is 
1 ( )( )
( )
Fi b
a f
θθ θ
θ
 
= − + 
 
 .  Compared with that under complete information, the vendor faces a downward 
adjustment in the production level by 
1 ( )
( )
F
a f
θ
θ
.  This reduction follows from incentive compatibility of the 
contract, which dictates that the vendor leaves some surplus ( )( )( ), ( ), ( )U I iθ θ η θ θ θ− = – also known as 
the information rent – to a consumer of marginally more efficient type to prevent her from deviating.  Since 
the vendor needs to process 
( )i
a
θ
 amount of additional information to generate this surplus, the total cost 
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associated with delivering the rent to those with lower privacy sensitivity than type θ  consumers is
 
1 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) i Fi f v dv
a a
θ
θ
θ θθ =∫  .  The underproduction is a consequence of accounting for this additional cost 
as the vendor determines ( )i θ . 
The integral component in the contract, 
1 ( )( )
( )
F vi v dv b v dv
a f v
θ θ
θ θ
  
= − +  
  
∫ ∫ , is the amount of 
information rent required to prevent a consumer of type θ  from pretending to be more privacy sensitive 
than she is.  It is derived from aggregating incremental rents ( )( )i θ  from the most privacy-sensitive 
consumers, and is delivered by the vendor through additional preservations.  
Figure 1 presents a graphical illustration of the optimal contract under asymmetric information, 
and demonstrates how the slopes of the two contracting variables { }( ), ( )I θ η θ   change with respect to the 
technological efficiency coefficient ( )a .  It can be observed that both information acquisition and privacy 
preservation approach zero when technological efficiency is sufficiently low.  This implies that shutting 
down a portion of the market (intentionally excluding consumers of certain types) may indeed be more 
profitable for the vendor under certain circumstances.  The following proposition characterizes the optimal 
market coverage from the vendor’s perspective. 
Proposition 2.  The optimal market coverage of { }( ), ( )I θ η θ   is defined by *[ , ]θ θ , where * min{ , }sθ θ θ=  
and sθ  is the solution of ( )
( )
Fab
f
θθ
θ
 
= + 
 
. 
Proposition 2 shows that market coverage is increasing in both technological and commercial 
efficiencies of the vendor 0 and 0
s s
a b
θ θ ∂ ∂
> > ∂ ∂ 
, and that the whole market is served as long as 
( )
( )
Fab
f
θθ
θ
 
≥ + 
 
.  Intuitively, the more effectively the vendor generates revenues from commercially using 
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consumer information (i.e., the larger b  is), the more eager he is to acquire such information and expand 
the market.  The positive association between personalization efficiency ( )a  and market coverage, however, 
is less apparent.  From the privacy-preservation level ( ){ }1( ) ( ) ( )a i i v dva
θ
θ
η θ θ θ= − + ∫  , we can observe 
that an improvement in technological efficiency not only reduces consumers’ marginal production cost 
( )aθ −  – which by itself diminishes the shutdown portion as consumers find it less costly to participate – 
but also magnifies the compensatory role of ( )η θ ; i.e. for the same level of information to be used for 
commercial purposes ( )( )i θ , less privacy-preservation is required.  Hence the vendor is motivated to serve 
a larger market while using a larger portion of the acquired information for generating revenues.  For the 
remaining analyses, we shall assume b to be sufficiently large to induce full market coverage. 
We have now characterized the optimal solution, with the premise that the vendor has complete 
freedom in specifying both the levels of information acquisition and privacy preservation in the contract.  In 
the following subsections, we relax this assumption and consider the scenario where a regulator takes a 
more proactive role in protecting consumers’ privacy online.  Specifically, we investigate the welfare 
implications of two legislative options, namely the minimum privacy-preservation policy and the maximum 
information-acquisition policy.  Our goal is to inform policy makers on the choice of an optimal regulatory 
device and the corresponding magnitude of control in inducing efficient market outcomes.   
4.2 Minimum privacy-preservation policy 
Under a minimum privacy-preservation policy, the vendor is mandated to reserve a predetermined 
proportion of information (also referred to as “preservation ratio”) from any secondary use for all consumers 
that he serves.  Our solution approach involves a two-stage process:  In the first stage, the regulator sets a 
preserving ratio; then conditional on this additional constraint, the vendor designs the optimal contract in 
the second stage.  We derive the optimal solution from the regulator’s perspective using backward 
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induction by first considering the effects of a given preservation ratio on the vendor’s objective.  Formally, 
we introduce the following inequality into the vendor’s programme5
 
: 
( )
( )I
η θ α
θ
≥  (4.1) 
where 1 α α> ≥ .  ( )
( )I
η θα
θ
=


 is lowest attainable preservation in a contract based solely on the vendor’s 
self-interest 
( ) 0
( )
d
d I
η θ
θ θ
  
≥     


; hence it defines the lower bound of an effective regulatory intervention.   
The following lemma establishes that given this additional preservation requirement, the vendor 
finds that a partially-bunching solution dominates their fully-separating counterparts.  Further, it indicates 
that solutions with more than one bunching interval or with bunching intervals at other locations cannot 
be optimal for the vendor.   
Lemma 3.  The optimal menu { }( ), ( )P PI θ η θ  bunches the low-end of the type space ˆ[ , ]θ θ . 
This lemma leads to the following proposition. 
Proposition 3.  The optimal contract under a given preservation ratio is characterized by the followings: 
1. There exists a lower interval ˆ[ , ]θ θ  where bunching takes place.  θˆ  is jointly determined by the 
following two equations: 
 
( ) ( )( )
ˆ ˆ( ) 1( ) ˆ ˆ( ) 1 0ˆ( ) ( )
FF f d a
f f
θ
θ
θ α λθθ θ θ θ θ α λ
θ θ
   − −  + − + + − − =            
∫  (4.2) 
                                                     
5 The reason behind expressing the minimum preservation as a ratio to the total amount of information 
acquired by the vendor, as opposed to an absolute value, is that otherwise the vendor can respond by 
arbitrarily increasing information acquisition to counteract the effects of such a policy.   
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 ( ) ( )
ˆ( ) 11ˆ ˆand 1 ( , , )
( )
F
b
a f
θ α λ
α ι θ λ α θ
θ
 − −
− = − +  ′ 
 (4.3) 
where 
( ) ( )( ) 1 ( ) 11 1 1( , , )
( ) ( )
F F v
b b v dv
a a f a f v
θ
θ
θ α λ α λ
ι θ λ α θ θ
θ
    − − − −    = − + + − +                  
∫ . 
2. In the upper interval of the type space ˆ[ , ]θ θ , the optimal solution { }( , , ), ( , , )P PI θ λ α η θ λ α  satisfies 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) 1 ( ) 11 1 1( , , )
( ) ( )
( ) 1 ( ) 11 1 1( , , )
( ) ( )
P
P
F F v
I b b v dv
a a f a f v
F F v
a b b v dv
a a f a f v
θ
θ
θ
θ
θ α λ α λ
θ λ α θ θ
θ
θ α λ α λ
η θ λ α θ θ
θ
     − − − −    = − + + − +                    

    − − − −     = − − + + − +                   
∫
∫
, 
whereas in the lower interval of the type space ˆ[ , ]θ θ , it satisfies 
ˆ( , , ) ( , , )
ˆ( , , ) ( , , )
P P
P P
I Iθ λ α θ λ α
η θ λ α η θ λ α
 =

=
 and 
ˆ ˆ( , , ) ( , , )P PIη θ λ α α θ λ α= . 
3. ( ) ( )ˆ( ) 1 ( ) 1 0F Fθ α λ θ α λ− − ≥ − − ≥  for ˆ[ , ]θ θ θ∈ . 
In all of the above equations, λ is the shadow price associated with the inequality (4.1).  It ensures 
( )( ) 1 0
( )
F
f
θ α λ
θ
θ θ
− − ∂
+ ≥ ∂  
 on ˆ[ , ]θ θ . 
The first two parts of the proposition describe how the vendor can best respond to a mandated 
level of minimum preservation ratio in the contract.  It indicates that simply bunching the segment with 
ratios smaller than α  cannot be an optimal solution.  Instead, a superior strategy for the vendor is to also 
revise production levels by increasing the production level by 
( )1
( )f
α λ
θ
−
 for all consumers falling under the 
separating region.  The last part of this proposition indicates that the underproduction problem for the less 
efficient consumers ( ˆ[ , ]θ θ θ∈ ) are moderated compared with that in the benchmark model, yet not 
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significant enough to induce overproduction.  As a result, both consumer surplus and vendor’s profit 
increase on that segment.  
For consumers falling under the bunching region ( ˆ[ , ]θ θ θ∈ ), productions are uniformly set to the 
level of 
( )ˆ( ) 11 ˆ
ˆ( )
F
b
a f
θ α λ
θ
θ
 − −
− +  
 
.  Compared with those in the benchmark case
1 ( )
( )
Fb
a f
θθ
θ
  
− +  
  
, 
the underproduction problem is more significant for consumers with sufficiently low privacy sensitivities 
while less severe for those who are in the neighborhood of θˆ .  The overall effects of bunching the less 
privacy-sensitive consumers ( )ˆ[ , ]θ θ θ∈  is a suppression of the aggregate production 
( )ˆ ˆ( ) 11 ( ) ˆ ( ) 0ˆ( ) ( )
FF f d
a f f
θ
θ
θ α λθθ θ θ θ
θ θ
   − −  + − + >            
∫ .  On the other hand, this suppression also leads 
to a relaxation of the minimum-preservation constraint for the separating region where underproduction is 
alleviated.  The associated gain is captured by 
( )
( )
1 ˆ
1
a
a
α
θ λ
α
 −
− 
− 
, which should be equal to the loss in 
production efficiency on the bunching region on optimality.  This tradeoff is captured by equation (4.2).  
The shape of the optimal menu under uniform distribution and a given regulation level is 
illustrated in Figure 2.  We can observe that though a minimum privacy-preservation policy results in the 
vendor suppressing the production of the lower-end segments of the market; it also enables the vendor to 
increase production in the remaining segments.  Figure 3 contrasts the preservation ratio under the 
regulatory solution with that in the benchmark case, and demonstrates the ratio to be increasing in α  in 
the separating region, while being uniformly larger than that of the baseline menu except at θ .  
Based on equations (4.2) and (4.3) , the following corollary establishes how the magnitude of the 
ratio affects the shape of the optimal contract. 
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Corollary 1. ˆ ( ) 0θ α′ > : the vendor bunches a larger portion of the market when faced with a higher 
preservation ratio.  There exists a threshold ( )α  beyond which the vendor serves all consumers with an 
identical contract 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 1( ) , ( )
1 1 1 1
P PI b bαα η α
α α α α
     = − = −       − − − −     
. 
 Having established corollary 1, we can now formulate the social planner’s objective as a piecewise 
function of α  on [0,1) : 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( ){
2
ˆ 2( )
ˆ( )
1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )   [0, )  
2
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ˆ         ( ), ( ), ( ) , ( ),    [ , )
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1         ,
2
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P P
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b I I I f d
a
b i i
i f d b i
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SW
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θ
θ α
θ
θ
θ α
θθ η θ θ η θ θ η θ θ θ α α
θ α λ α α θ α λ α α
θ θ α λ α α θ θ θ λ α α α α α
α
θ
 − − − − − ∀ ∈ 
 
 −

− + ∀ ∈
=
−
∫
∫
∫
  
  
( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )
( )
2
2
( ), , ( ), ( )                         
1 1 ( ) 1 ( )
2
         1 ( ) ( )                                                      [ , )
P
P P
P
i f d
a
b I I
I f d
a
θ
θ
θλ α α θ λ α α θ θ
α α α α
θ α α θ θ α α α











 −  


  − − − 

 − − ∀ ∈ 

∫
 (4.4) 
The following proposition establishes that regulatory intervention by imposing a minimum 
preservation ratio improves social welfare.  It also characterizes the optimal degree of intervention from the 
social-planner’s perspective.   
Proposition 4.  A minimum privacy-preservation policy is welfare-enhancing; in particular, the optimal 
regulation level lies within ( ),α α α∈ , inducing a partially-separating market outcome. 
 Proposition 4 offers important insights for a policy maker pursuing legislative options in governing 
the information practice of online personalization vendors.  Our findings suggest that although the vendor 
has incentives to introduce privacy-preservation in the contract design, the level of this self-serving 
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preservation is not sufficient from the society’s perspective.  We demonstrate that social efficiency can be 
enhanced by simply introducing a minimum preservation policy by which the vendor is required to 
preserve a portion of the acquired information from any secondary uses.  The fact that the optimal 
minimum preservation level lies strictly above the attainable preservation in the absence of intervention 
demonstrates the policy to be an invaluable device for the regulator.  
Further, we find that the social planner prefers to induce a partially-separating market outcome. 
This is a counter-intuitive finding, as one may expect that a fully-separating menu that serves each 
consumer with a different degree of information acquisition and privacy preservation to be of best interest 
to the society (an equivalence of a benevolent provider of a public goods charging more from the rich and 
less from the poor).  In fact, this is precisely the case under the complete information, when the vendor can 
extract full surplus from consumers having exactly the same objective as that of the social planner.  Under 
asymmetric information, however, the lack of information renders full extraction no longer possible.  The 
distorted incentive leads the vendor to adopt a more aggressive differentiation strategy than is required to 
achieve social-efficiency, resulting in severe underproduction from the societal perspective.  By imposing a 
minimum privacy-preservation policy, the regulator constrains the vendor’s ability to exercise excessive 
discrimination yet not to the extent that completely deprives him of the ability to differentiate (i.e. when 
α α= ). 
Figure 4 presents a graphical illustration of social welfare under different preservation levels with 
uniform distribution.  We can observe that the social welfare peaks at a point strictly smaller than α .  The 
kink that we observe at α  reflects the fact that participation constraint no longer binds for ( ,1)α α∈ . 
4.3 Maximum information-acquisition policy 
We now explore an alternative regulation whereby the policy maker restricts the vendor’s ability in 
gathering customer information by setting an upper bound on the amount of information to be acquired.  
We refer to this upper bound as an “information boundary”.  Similar to the analysis on the minimum 
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privacy-preservation policy, our solution approach here also involves a two-stage process with backward 
induction.  We shall first characterize the vendor’s optimal contract in the existence of an information 
boundary.  Formally, we introduce the following inequality into the vendor’s programme: 
 ( ) ( )I K Iθ θ≤ <   (4.5) 
( )K I θ< where  is a positive finite number, and ensures that the information boundary constraint is 
relevant for 
Lemma 4. When 
consumers with certain degrees of privacy sensitivity.  The following lemma shows that full 
separation is no longer optimal.  
( )K I θ<  , the optimal menu { }( ), ( )B BI θ η θ  bunches the low-end of the type space 
ˆ[ , ]θ θ . 
This lemma serves the same role as Lemma 3 does for the previous subsection, and leads to the 
following proposition. 
Proposition 5.  The optimal contract under an information boundary is characterized by the following 
conditions: 
1. There exists a lower interval ˆ[ , ]θ θ  that corresponds to the mass of consumers who are being served an 
identical contract, while the remaining market is served with a separating menu.  θˆ  is jointly determined 
by the following two equations: 
 
ˆ ˆ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ( ) 0ˆ( ) ( )
F F f d
f f
θ
θ
θ θ λθ θ θ θ θλ
θ θ
    + + − + + =   
    
∫  (4.6) 
 ˆand  ( , ) Kκ θ λ =  (4.7) 
where 
1 ( ) 1 1 ( )( , )
( ) ( )
F F vb b v dv
a a f a a f v
θ
θ
θ θ λ λκ θ λ θ
θ
      + +
= − + + − +      
      
∫ .  
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2. In the upper interval of the type space ˆ[ , ]θ θ , the optimal solution { }( , ), ( , )B BI θ λ η θ λ  satisfies 
( )
1 1 ( ) 1 ( )( , )
( ) ( )
1 1 ( ) 1 ( )( , )
( ) ( )
B
B
F F vI b b v dv
a a f a f v
F F va b b v dv
a a f a f v
θ
θ
θ
θ
θ λ λθ λ θ θ
θ
θ λ λη θ λ θ θ
θ
        + + = − + + − +        
         

       + +  = − − + + − +       
        
∫
∫
, 
whereas in the lower interval of the type space ˆ[ , ]θ θ , it satisfies 
ˆ( , ) ( , )
ˆ( , ) ( , )
B B
B B
I Iθ λ θ λ
η θ λ η θ λ
 =

=
. 
In the above equations, λ  is the shadow value associated with the information boundary 
constraint (equation (4.5)); it ensures that ( ) 0
( )
F
f
θ λθ
θ θ
 ∂ +
+ ≥ ∂  
 on ˆ[ , ]θ θ  .   
The shadow value measures the marginal increase in revenue with a uniform relaxation of the 
information boundary on the bunching area ( )ˆ[ , ]θ θ .  We can observe from Proposition 5 that λ  is also 
effective in determining the contracts for those whose information boundary is not relevant. The underlying 
reason is that a marginal increase in information acquisition for an unconstrained type of consumers (who 
lie in the separating interval) creates an externality for all their constrained peers (who fall on the bunching 
interval) through a chain reaction dictated by the monotonicity condition in Lemma 2.  As a result, the 
tightening of information boundary for constrained consumers leads to an increase in the shadow price that 
the vendor needs to account for when designing contracts for consumers falling within the unconstrained 
interval.  
We can also observe that the existence of an information boundary lowers both information 
acquisition and privacy preservation for all consumers compared with the second-best solution presented in 
Proposition 1.  Further, this reduction is more severe for consumers with lower privacy sensitivity
( ) ( )( )( ) ( , ) 0, ( ) ( , ) 0B BI I θ θθ θ λ η θ η θ λ− ≤ − ≤  ; the reason is that the marginal payoffs from utilizing 
their information are relatively low from the vendor’s perspective when they already produce at high levels. 
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The fact that we observe a bunching solution for the most efficient segment of the market appears 
to contradict the conventional understanding in mechanism design, which suggests that the vendor always 
prefers to differentiate the most efficient portion of the market (e.g., Mussa and Rosen, 1978); i.e. the 
vendor would bunch (and require lower production from) consumers with high or intermediate privacy-
sensitivities in exchange for the ability to differentiate consumers with low privacy-sensitivity.  However, 
Proposition 5 indicates that these alternatives are not feasible profit-maximizing strategies for two reasons.   
First, the monotonicity condition that is automatically fulfilled for the most efficient consumers in 
the baseline model6
( )( )( ) ( ) 0BI I λθθ θ− <
 may be violated in the presence of an information boundary.  The introduction of an 
information boundary reduces the slackness of the monotonicity condition for the whole market, causing 
information acquisition for the less privacy-sensitive consumers to diminish at a faster rate 
 ; hence the monotonicity condition starts to bind from the lower end of the market 
( )θ . Bunching those consumers is the only remedy for retaining the monotonicity condition and thus the 
incentive-compatibility of the contractible menu. 
Second, bunching the most efficient types allows the vendor to increase the production efficiency of 
the less efficient consumers.  To illustrate the underlying dynamics, we construct a fully-separating menu 
(thereby suffice to ensure the fulfillment of the monotonicity condition) that serves the high-types, i.e. 
ˆ[ , ]θ θ  ( θˆ  is the point at which the menu reaches the information cap ( )K ), while being incentive 
compatibility on the target segment.  Equation (4.7) describes the method of constructing such a menu. 
                                                     
6 This can be generalized to any distribution with bounded support. Particularly, Barlow et al. (1963) 
show that for a distribution with its support bounded from above, the inverse hazard rate 
1 ( )
( )
F
f
θ
θ
 −
 
 
 is 
non-increasing in ( , ]θ ε θ− . Analogously, we can prove the dual case; that is, for a distribution with its 
support bounded from below, 
( )
( )
F
f
θ
θ
 is non-decreasing in [ , )θ θ ε+ . 
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0ˆ
λ
θ
∂
<
∂
 derived from equation (4.7) implies that with a fixed information boundary, serving a 
larger market with a fully-separating menu induces more severe distortions in production 
(
1 ( )( , )
( )
Fi b
a f
θ λθ λ θ
θ
 +
= − + 
 
) on ˆ[ , ]θ θ , an effect that is economically equivalent to lowering the 
information boundary.  Narrowing the market coverage of this separating menu (shifting θˆ  to the right) 
thus moderates the underproduction problem, but at the cost of suppressing productions from the 
remaining segment at type θˆ ’s level.  Proposition 5 establishes that the gain from the former ( )θˆλ should 
balances the loss from the latter 
ˆ ˆ( ) ( )ˆ ( )ˆ ( )( )
F F f d
ff
θ
θ
θ λ θθ θ θ θ
θθ
     + + − +          
∫
 
on optimality, which is 
captured by equation (4.6).   
To illustrate the general results derived in Proposition 5, we apply a uniform distribution to 
consumer types, and graphically represent the optimal menus under different levels of information 
boundary in Figure 5.  It can be observed that the bunching regions of the optimal menu expand with 
lower information boundaries.  Such an expansion continues until the boundary reaches a certain threshold, 
beyond which a purely-bunching solution consistently outperforms any menu of other structures (note that 
this result does not hold for more general distributions; see corollary 2 for details).  In addition, the lowering 
of information boundary results in more severe underproduction problem.  
Given that θˆ  and λ  in equations (4.6) and (4.7) are both endogenous in K , we use ˆ( )Kθ  and 
( )Kλ to denote these two functions. The following corollary summarizes how the vendor’s optimal 
bunching region changes in response to different levels of information boundary. 
Corollary 2.  
1. ˆ ( ) 0Kθ ′ < :  lowering information boundary leads to an expansion of the bunching interval. 
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2. ˆ( ) [ ,min{ , })Kθ θ θ θ∈   where 
( )inf : 0
( )
F
f
θθ θ θ
θ
 
≡ − = 
 
 : the optimal menu does not necessarily 
degenerate to a purely-bunching one even under a sufficiently low information boundary. 
The expansion of the bunching interval is straight forward. The second result, however, is 
somewhat counter-intuitive.  Specifically, it suggests that if there exists some θ  such that ( ) 0
( )
F
f
θθ
θ
− ≤ , 
then differentiating the least efficient segment of the market is always a profit-maximization strategy.  
Further, only in a market with consumer types being evenly distributed 
( )
( )
F
f
θθ
θ
 
> 
 
 everywhere on its 
support can a purely-bunching menu emerge.   
Given the monotonicity of ˆ( )Kθ established in corollary 2, we can now formulate the social 
planner’s objective as a function of K : 
For the set of partially-separating menus, 
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while for the set of purely-bunching menus, 
( ) ( ) ( )21( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2
B B B B B BSW K b I K K I K K I K K f d
a
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where ( )BI K K=  and ( )B aK Kθη
θ
−
=  from the fact that the participation constraint binds at θ .  The 
result is summarized in the following proposition. 
Proposition 6.  A maximum information-acquisition policy results in welfare reduction. 
The result presented in proposition 6 stands in stark contrast with that under a minimum-privacy-
preservation policy, which improves social welfare.  The intuition behind this result is that an information 
boundary first takes effects on the least privacy-sensitive consumers, who might demand more 
personalization than is available under this policy, while without offering any effective assistance to the 
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more privacy-sensitive consumers.  Hence an information boundary leads to an unambiguous reduction in 
both consumer and vendor surpluses. 
5. Conclusion 
5.1 Implications of our work 
Information technology plays a critical role in both the provision and usage of personalization by online 
vendors and consumers.  On one hand, more sophisticated technologies allow firms to deliver more and 
better personalized services to consumers while seamlessly sharing more information with their associates, 
thus allowing for higher profit potentials; on the other hand, the very same technologies that enable firms 
to share larger amounts of information more quickly with more parties also exacerbate consumers’ concerns 
for privacy.  Recent controversies surrounding Facebook’s “Instant Personalization” program is a vivid 
example.  Under Instant Personalization, Facebook shares users’ information with their associates, allowing 
them to “instantly” personalize the web experience for those users even if it were their first time interacting 
with the websites.  Facebook’s information practice has not only prompted public uproars and protests 
from various consumer groups, but also resulted in some Facebook users boycotting certain services while 
others terminating their accounts altogether (Anonymous 2010).  Therefore, the tradeoffs between 
personalization and privacy give rise to an interesting predicament: without the ability to use customer 
information to generate revenues, firms would not have incentives to offer free personalization; without a 
mechanism in place to govern the usage and protection of customer data, consumers would not share their 
personal information.  Our research investigates this seemingly evident yet subtle issue from the 
perspectives of both consumers and online personalization provider. 
Our answer to the personalization-privacy dilemma is to transform the original compensation 
problem into an information partition one.  We show that the vendor can design a contractible menu using 
privacy-preservation as an instrument, which allows consumers with varying privacy sensitivity to self-
select into adopting a desirable duo of information acquisition and protection.  As a result, full participation 
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can be induced even under the most restrictive market conditions, and a second-best outcome is achieved 
when the exact levels of privacy sensitivity of individual consumers are unknown to the vendor. 
The contributions of our work are two-fold: Theoretically, our technique for deriving an optimal 
implementable contract in the absence of any external instruments is ground-breaking in mechanism design.  
To our best knowledge, we are the first to propose a contract-theoretic framework that eradicates the 
reliance on external transfer common in traditional designs.  While readers may notice certain similarities 
between our approach and the revenue/cost sharing rules established in extant literature, two attributes of 
our model define its uniqueness: first, existing models rely primarily on monetary instruments, while ours is 
applicable also to non-price contexts; second, revenues sacrificed by the principal contribute to a reduction 
in cost, as opposed to an increment in transfer or benefits, to the agent.  Our methodology thus offers a 
systematic approach in solving a new class of adverse selection problems in which production is intrinsically 
correlated with compensation; for example, it can be applied to investigate the development of an open 
source project that depends solely on voluntary contribution, while the management board's objective is to 
maximize the overall efforts from all participants.  Though contribution is (heterogeneously) costly to 
developers, higher effort levels are intrinsically correlated with larger personal payoffs; e.g. being more fun, 
gaining deeper knowledge, and performance improvements in their paid work (e.g. Lerner and Tirole 2005).  
Practically, not only does our proposed mechanism provide a solution to an otherwise unviable market, but 
that the contract is also incentive-compatible and can easily be implemented in reality.  Our research offers 
important guidelines to online personalization vendors and policy makers in addressing the growing 
concerns over online privacy.   
First, our analyses on preservation ratio and information boundary offer valuable insights and 
concrete recommendations to online personalization vendors regarding how an optimal contract can be 
revised when confronted with different limitations.  Specifically, we show that the vendor can benefit from 
increasing the bunching interval, making an identical offer to more consumers when the preservation ratio 
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is sufficiently high, while increasing the production level by the less efficient segment.  On the other hand, 
the optimal strategy for a vendor confronting a tight information boundary is to bunch the efficient 
segment while reducing the production level by the most privacy-sensitive consumers at the same time.  
Second, while online personalization vendors may have economic incentives to provide consumers 
with preservation through some form of privacy-management settings, the level of protection delivered by 
these options may not be sufficient from the regulator’s perspective (Giles 2010).  Our welfare analysis 
suggests that a minimum privacy-preservation policy can not only serve as a simple yet powerful device, 
but also a superior legislative option compared with limiting vendors’ ability in acquiring customer 
information in inducing a more socially-efficient outcome.   
5.2 Future research directions 
 In this paper, we seek to provide a solution to the case where consumers’ privacy concerns are sufficiently 
high to threaten the de-facto existence of the personalization market.  Our proposed mechanism can be 
readily extended to examine a more general scenario with the coexistence of both privacy-seekers, who 
refrain from participating completely, and convenience-seeking consumers who prefer as much 
personalization as possible.  Further, a sensitivity analysis on the distribution of consumer types under the 
generalized market conditions can reveal the effects of changes in consumers’ privacy concerns on the 
optimal contract and equilibrium market outcome.  Finally, we have assumed in our model that technology 
efficiency is exogenously determined; in reality, online portals often need to decide on the investment level 
in personalization technologies prior to engaging in an information-sharing contract with the consumers.  A 
model that endogenizes such an investment decision and hence the corresponding efficiency by which the 
vendor is able to generate values to their consumers would be an interesting direction to pursue.    
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Appendix A: Figures 
Figure 1. Optimal menus under different levels of technology efficiency  
 
 
Figure 2. Optimal menu under minimum privacy-preservation policy versus benchmark solution 
 
Figure 3. Equilibrium preservation ratios under minimum privacy-preservation policy and in the benchmark case 
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Figure 4. Social welfare under different levels of privacy-preservation regulation 
 
Figure 5. Optimal menus under different levels of information boundary 
 
 
Appendix B: Proofs 
Properties of log-concave density functions 
The function ln f  is concave if and only if ( )
( )ln ( )
( )
d ff
d f
θθ
θ θ
′ ′′ =  
   
is non-positive. 
The function ln F  is concave if and only if ( )
2
2
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ln
( ) ( )
d f f F fF
d F F
θ θ θ θ
θ θ θ
′  −′′ = = 
   
is non-
positive. 
If ( )f θ  is log-concave, then for all [ , ]θ θ θ∈  
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
f f f vF f v dv f v dv f f f
f f f v
θ θ
θ θ
θ θθ θ θ θ
θ θ
′ ′ ′
= ≤ = − ≤∫ ∫  
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Therefore, 2( ) ( ) ( ) 0f F fθ θ θ′ − ≤ . It also implies ( ) 0
( )
Fd
d f
θ
θ θ
 
≥ 
 
. 
 
Proof of Lemma 1: ( )* *( ) ( )a Iθη θ θ θ= −  follows from the vendor’s ability to extract all 
consumer surplus under complete information. The form of the contract menu is a result of the 
vendor’s objective to maximize a concave function of ( )I θ . □ 
 
Proof of Lemma 2: For aθ > , a piecewise 1C  incentive-compatible allocation { }( ), ( )I θ η θ
satisfies / 0d dη θ ≤  and ( ) 0
dI da
d d
ηθ θ
θ θ
− + =  a.e. on [ , ]θ θ . 
For a direct mechanism of { } ,( ), ( )I θ θ θθ η θ  ∈  , truth-telling is the best response from 
consumers’ perspective.  This is captured by the IC in equation (3.7), which implies that the 
following first-order condition is satisfied: 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( ) | 0aI I θ θθ θ θ η θ =− − =
  
 
  
or 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( ) 0aI Iθ θ θ η θ− − =   . (8) 
Equation (8) holds for all [ , ]θ θ θ∈  since θ  is unknown to the principal. 
Further, it is also necessary to satisfy the local second-order condition, 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( ) | 0aI I θ θθ θ θ η θ =− − ≤
  
 
  
or 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( ) 0aI Iθ θ θ η θ− − ≤   . (9) 
By differentiating equation (8), equation (9) can be simplified as  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) 0I iθ η θ θ− = ≤  . (10) 
Equations (8) and (10) constitute the local incentive constraints, which ensure that the 
agent has no incentive to lie locally.  Based on the single-crossing property, local incentive 
constraints also imply the global constraints. □ 
 
 
The principal’s control problem  
Let ( ) uη θ =  be the control variable and thus ( )I u
a
θθ
θ
=
−
  from lemma 2.  The principal’s 
objective represented in equation (3.7) can be transformed into an equivalent problem in the 
optimal control framework.  
 
( ) ( )
( )
21( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )                    
2
. .              ( ) 0       ( )
                  ( ) ( ) ( ) 0       ( ) ( )       ( ) 0
b I I I f d
s t u I u
a
aI I I
θ
θ
θ η θ θ η θ θ θ θ
θη θ θ
θ
θ θ θ η θ θ η θ η θ
 − − − − 
 
= ≤ =
−
− − ≥ ≥ ≥
∫

  (11) 
We restrict attention to piecewise continuous controls, u , and therefore piecewise 
smooth schedules.  The corresponding Hamiltonian-Lagrangian is defined: 
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( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 2 1 3 4, , , , , , , , , , , ( ) ( )L I u p p H I u p p I u u ua
θη λ θ η θ λ θ η θ λ λ
θ
 ≡ + − − − − − 
, (12) 
where ( ) ( ) ( )21 2 1 2
1, , , , , ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
H I u p p b I I I f p u p u
a
θη θ θ η θ θ η θ θ θ
θ
 ≡ − − − − + +  − 
. 
In this equation, ( ) and ( )I θ η θ  are state variables, 1( )p θ  and 2 ( )p θ  are two co-state 
variables having one-sided limits everywhere, and ( )1 2 3 4( ) ( ), ( ), ( ), ( )λ θ λ θ λ θ λ θ λ θ=  is a non-
decreasing vector function, among which 1( )λ θ , 3( )λ θ , and 4 ( )λ θ  are associated with the three 
pure-state constraints in (11), while 2 ( )λ θ  applies to our investigation of the regulatory 
intervention.  Following Seierstad and Sydsæter (1987, Theorems 2 and 3, Chapter 5), we 
construct the necessary and sufficient conditions for an optimal schedule: 
 ( )* * * 1 2arg max , , , , ,  for all u 0 and for a.e. ( , )
u
u H I u p pη θ θ θ θ= ≤ ∈ ; (13) 
( )jλ θ  is constant on any interval where its corresponding constraint is relaxed; and it is 
continuous at all ( , )θ θ θ∈  where its corresponding constraint binds.  Further, 
*u  is 
discontinuous (Take 1( )λ θ  as an example, this statement expresses the fact that it is constant 
on any interval where ( )( ) ( ) ( ) 0aI Iθ θ θ η θ− − >  at all ( , )θ θ θ∈  at which 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) 0aI Iθ θ θ η θ− − =  and *u  is discontinuous.) 
Define *1 1 1 3 4p p θλ λ λ= + − + , and ( )*2 2 1 3p p a θ λ λ= + − +  where *1p  and 
*
2p  are strictly 
continuous, and have derivatives a.e. given by 
( )*1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Lp I b fλ θ θ η θ θ
η
∂
= − = − − −
∂

 
and ( )( )*2 1( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( )
Lp I b f
I
θ η θ θ λ θ∂= − = − − − −
∂
 ; 
Finally, 1 2 1 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0p p p pθ θ θ θ= = = = and ( ) 0jλ θ =  (the transversality conditions).  
By definitions of *1 ( )p θ  and 
*
2 ( )p θ , we have 
* *
1 2( ) ( ) 0p pθ θ= = .  When combined with the 
differential equations of the two co-state variables and the continuity of *1 ( )p θ  and 
*
2 ( )p θ , this 
implies that 
 
( )( ){ }
( ){ }
*
1 1
*
2 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( )
p b I v v f v v dv
p I v v b f v v dv
θ
θ
θ
θ
θ η λ
θ η λ
 = − − +

 = − − + −

∫
∫
. 
accordingly, 
 
( )( ){ }
( ){ } ( )
1 1 1 4
2 1 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( )
p b I v v f v v dv
p I v v b f v v dv a
θ
θ
θ
θ
θ η λ θλ θ λ θ
θ η λ θ λ θ
 = − − + − −

 = − − + − + −

∫
∫
 (14) 
From equation (13), separation (i.e., * 0u < ) is only optimal on the interval where 
( ) 1 2 0a p pθ θ− + = ; if there exists some interval over which ( ) 1 2 0a p pθ θ− + > , it is optimal for 
the firm to bunch { }( ), ( )I θ η θ  on this interval (i.e., when 
* 0u = ). 
 
Lemma A1.  
1) For any piecewise 1C  incentive-compatible allocation { }( ), ( )I θ η θ , ( ) ( )I θ η θ≥  is irrelevant to 
the principal’s objective if ( ) 0η θ >  a.e. on [ , ]θ θ . 
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2) On optimality, ( )( ) ( ) ( ) 0aI Iθ θ θ η θ− − ≥  binds for some θ . 
 
Proof : ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0d dI daI I a I I
d d d
ηθ θ θ η θ θ θ θ η θ η θ θ
θ θ θ
− − = − + − − = − ≤   .  
The second equality follows from Lemma 2, and the first argument follows from 
( ) ( )I θ η θ≥ .   It implies that ( )( ) ( ) ( )aI Iθ θ θ η θ− −  is non-increasing in θ  on [ , ]θ θ .   
First, we show that ( )( ) ( ) ( ) 0aI Iθ θ θ η θ− − ≥  and ( ) ( )I θ η θ≥  are exclusive for ( ) 0I θ >  
on [ , ]θ θ  i.e. if one constraint is active for some θ , the other cannot be active for any [ , ]θ θ θ∈ . 
To prove this, consider a case where ( ) ( )I θ η θ≥ binds on some intervals. Lemma 2 
implies that / / 0dI d d dθ η θ≤ ≤ : once ( ) ( ) 0I θ η θ= >  at someθ
 , it continues to bind on the 
remaining interval ( , ]θ θ . Hence ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0aI I aIθ θ θ η θ θ− − = >  on ( , ]θ θ . 
Since ( )( ) ( ) ( )aI Iθ θ θ η θ− −  is non-increasing in θ . ( )( ) ( ) ( ) 0aI Iθ θ θ η θ− − > also holds for 
[ , )θ θ θ∈  .  Hence, the participation constraint is inactive on [ , ]θ θ .  The reverse can be shown 
in a similar fashion. 
Second, we show that vendor prefers binding the participation constraint to ( ) ( )I θ η θ≥ .  
Suppose on the contrary, the vendor binds ( ) ( )I θ η θ≥  at some θ . According to the above 
discussion, ( )( ) ( ) ( ) 0aI Iθ θ θ η θ− − > on [ , ]θ θ implies 1( ) 0λ θ =  on [ , ]θ θ . Since the transversality 
conditions and (14) require that 1 4( ) ( ) 1 0aλ θ λ θ+ = > , it implies ( ) 0η θ ≥  should bind for some 
θ .  A contradiction is derived. □ 
Since the non-excessive preservation constraint to the vendor’s optimal solution is 
irrelevant, it has been taken out of consideration from our analysis. 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
From equation (7), ( ) 1 2
1 ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
F va p p a I v v b v f v dv
a f v
θ
θ
θ θ θ θ η
    − + = − − − +   
    
∫ . 
We now show that the optimal menu satisfies ( ) 1 2( ) ( ) 0a p pθ θ θ θ− + = on [ , ]θ θ .  Suppose on the 
contrary, there exists a pointθ  at which ( ) 1 2( ) ( ) | 0a p p θ θθ θ θ θ +=′− + >    . This implies
1 ( )( ) ( ) 0
( )
FI b
a f
θθ η θ θ
θ
  
− − − + >     

  

.  
By continuity, for an arbitrarily smallδ , ( ) 1 2( ) ( ) 0a p pθ θ θ θ− + > on ( , )θ θ δ+  .   
Based on equation (6) in the Online Appendix, we have * 0u = on ( , )θ θ δ+   (i.e., ( )I θ and ( )η θ  
keep constant on ( , )θ θ δ+  ). Since ( )
( )
F
f
θ
θ
is non-decreasing in θ , 1 ( )( ) ( )
( )
FI b
a f
θθ η θ θ
θ
 
− > − + 
 
 
 
holds on 
( , ]θ θ , as well as ( ) 1 2( ) ( ) 0a p pθ θ θ θ− + > .  Together they imply bunching till θ . As a consequence, 
( ){ } ( )1 1 1 ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0( )
F vp b I v v f v dv q b v I f v dv
a f v
θ θ
θ θ
θ η θ θ θ η θ
  
= − − − = − + − − <  
  
∫ ∫

 
 
This results in a contradiction to the transversality conditions, which require 1( ) 0p θ =  on 
optimality.  
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The optimal menu specified in Proposition 1 results directly from the intermediate result that
( ) 1 2( ) ( ) 0a p pθ θ θ θ− + =  on [ , ]θ θ  and the fact the participation constraint has to bind at θ from Lemma 
A1.  It is fully-revealing with 2
( )( )
( )
a Fu
a f
θ θθ θ
θ
′ −
= − + 
 
. □ 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 (refer to “free terminal problem” in Seierstad and Sydsæter (1987)): 
Given an arbitrary [ , ]Tθ θ θ∈  characterizing the market coverage of the optimal menu. There exists an 
admissible pair ( )( ), ( ), ( )T T TI uθ η θ θ  defined on [ , ]Tθ θ  with associated multipliers ( )Tp θ  and ( )Tq θ  
satisfying all the sufficient conditions for an optimal control problem. 
( )( ){ }
( ){ } ( )
1 1 1 4
2 1 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( )
T T T T T T
T T T T T
p b I v v f v v dv
p I v v b f v v dv a
θ
θ
θ
θ
θ η λ θλ θ λ θ
θ η λ θ λ θ
 = − − + − −

 = − − + − + −

∫
∫
 and 1 2( ) ( ) 0T T T Tp pθ θ= = . 
Define
 
( ) ( )2 1 2
1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
T
T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T
T
H b I I I f p p u
a
θ
θ θ η θ θ η θ θ θ θ θ θ
θ
− − − −  = − − − − + +   −   
Since 
( ) ( )( )1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0T T T T T T T T T TH q q Iθ θ θ θ η θ− −+ − − − > , *Tθ θ= . 
 
If ( )
( )
Fab
f
θθ θ
θ
< < + ,  there exists  θ

 satisfying ( )
( )
Fab
f
θθ
θ
= +


 . For an arbitrary  Tθ  satisfying Tθ θ≥

. 
On [ , )θ θ

, 1 ( )( ) ( )
( )
FI b
a f
θθ η θ θ
θ
 
− = − + 
 
, whereas on [ , ]Tθ θ

, ( ) ( ) 0I θ η θ= = . 1 4( ) ( ) ( )T T T T Taq q Fθ θ θ+ =  
( ) ( )( )1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0T T T T T T T T T TH q q Iθ θ θ θ η θ− −+ − − − = .  For an arbitrary Tθ  satisfying Tθ θ<

, 
( ) ( )( )
2
1 1
( ) ( )1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0
2 ( )
T T
T T T T T T T T T T T
T
f FH q q I b
a f
θ θ
θ θ θ θ η θ θ
θ
− −   + − − − = − + >     
. 
Together, the point that delimits the shutdown portion is θ

, which is the solution of ( )
( )
Fab
f
θθ
θ
= +


  □ 
 
Lemma A2.  Define the auxiliary function ( )( , )
( )
FP
f
θ µθ µ θ
θ
+
= + for [ , ]θ θ θ∈  where µ  is an 
arbitrary constant.  The function ( , )P θ µ  is quasi-convex in θ  on [ , ]θ θ  if 0µ ≥ ; and is 
increasing inθ  on [ , ]θ θ  if 1 0µ− ≤ < .  
 
Proof:  
We only prove the first part of this lemma. The proof of the latter follows a symmetric 
argument.  
To substantiate this claim, consider an arbitrary extremum (providing one exists) θ

 of 
( , )P θ µ . Note that 
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( ) ( )
( )( )
2
3 3
2
2 2
2 2
2 ( ) ( ( ) ) ( )( ) ( , ) ( ) ( )
( )
4 ( ) ( ) ( ( ) ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 2 2 ( ) ( ( ) ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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( ) ( ) 2 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
f F ff P f
f
f f F f f f f f F f f f
f
f f f f f F
θθ
θ θ µ θθ θ µ θ
θ
θ θ θ µ θ θ θ θ θ θ µ θ θ θ
θ
θ θ θ θ θ θ µ
′− + ′=
′ ′′ ′ ′ ′− + − − − +
=
′ ′ ′′= − + − +
 
The condition that defines an extremum is given by 2
( ( ) ) ( )( , ) 2 0
( )
F fP
fθ
θ µ θθ µ
θ
′+
= − =
 

 , 
which can be the case only when ( ) 0f θ′ >

(since ( ) 0F θ µ+ ≥  for all [ , ]θ θ θ∈ ).  
Using
 
2
( ( ) ) ( )( , ) 2 0
( )
F fP
fθ
θ µ θθ µ
θ
′+
= − =
 


 
to simplify the above second-order expression, we have 
( )( )2 21( , ) ( ) 2 ( ) ( ) ( ) 0( ) ( )P f f f ff fθθ θ µ θ θ θ θθ θ ′ ′ ′′= + − >′
    
  ,  
where the inequality follows from the fact that 
( )
( )
d f
d f
θ
θ θ
′ 
 
   
is non-positive and ( ) 0f θ′ > . 
Therefore, for 0µ ≥ , if there exists any extremum of ( , )P θ µ , it must be a minimum. In 
other words, ( , )P θ µ  is single-peaked.  Since ( )f θ is continuously differentiable and positive 
everywhere on the support, ( , )Pθ θ µ  is continuous and well-defined.  Though an extremum does 
not necessarily exist, once ( , ) 0Pθ θ µ ≥ , it remains so for all higher values of θ . 
When 1 0µ− ≤ < , define θˆ  as the point at which ˆ( ) 0F θ µ+ = .  If there exists an 
extremum in the interval ˆ[0, )θ  , 2
( ( ) ) ( )( , ) 2 0
( )
F fP
fθ
θ µ θθ µ
θ
′+
= − =
 


 
requires ( ) 0f θ′ <

, implying 
that 
 ( )( )2 21( , ) ( ) 2 ( ) ( ) ( ) 0( ) ( )P f f f ff fθθ θ µ θ θ θ θθ θ ′ ′ ′′= + − <′
    
  .  
In other words, this extremum must be a maximum. Then at the point θˆ  where 
ˆ( ) 0F θ µ+ = , ˆ( , ) 0Pθ θ µ <  by continuity.  However, 2
ˆ ˆ( ( ) ) ( )ˆ( , ) 2 0ˆ( )
F fP
fθ
θ µ θθ µ
θ
′+
= − > . A 
contradiction is derived, implying that there cannot be an extremum in the interval ˆ[0, )θ . 
In the interval ˆ[ , ]θ θ , ( ) 0F θ µ+ > . ( , ) 0Pθ θ µ >  because ˆ( , ) 0Pθ θ µ >  according to the first part 
of this lemma. □ 
 
 
Minimum Privacy-Preservation Policy 
To investigate the effects of a minimum preservation ratio on the optimal schedule, we associate inequality 
in equation (4.1) with the Lagrange multiplier 2 ( )λ θ .  The new Hamiltonian-Lagrangian is given by: 
( ) ( )1 2 1 2, , , , , , ( ) ( )L I u p p H I u ua
αθη λ θ λ θ η θ λ
θ
 ≡ + − − − − 
. 
The necessary condition is similar to that in the benchmark case, except that *1 1 1 2p p θλ λ= + +  and 
( )*2 2 1 2p p a θ λ αλ= + − −  here.  Accordingly, the counterpart of equation (7) is 
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( )( ){ }
( ){ } ( )
1 1 1 2
2 1 1 2
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
p b I v v f v v dv
p I v v b f v v dv a
θ
θ
θ
θ
θ η λ θλ θ λ θ
θ η λ θ λ θ αλ θ
 = − − + − −

 = − − + − + − +

∫
∫
. 
To facilitate the analysis of the optimal schedule, we shall first present the following intermediate results: 
 
( )
( )( )
1 2
1 2
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( )
a p p
a I v v b f v v dv a
a
θ
θ
θ θ θ θ
θη λ θ α λ θ
− +
   = − − − − + − −      
∫
 (15) 
Transversality conditions imply 
 ( )1 21 ( ) 1 ( )aλ θ α λ θ= + −  (16) 
which suggests that at least one of the participation constraint and the minimum preservation constraint 
bind on optimality. 
It can be verified that 
( ) / 0
( )
d d
I
η θ
θ
θ
 
≥ 
 


 with the equality holding only at θ .  Define a function 
( )( )
( )
g
I
η θθ
θ
=


, then we have ( )g θ α= , and ( ) ag θθ
θ
−
= . 
The followings examine the monotonicity of ( ) ( )Iη θ α θ− . 
From Lemma 2, ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )d I I u u
d a
αθη θ α θ η θ α θ
θ θ
− = − = −
−

  with 0u ≤ , from which we 
observe that the monotonicity of ( ) ( )Iη θ α θ−  depends on the magnitude of 
a
αθ
θ −
 as opposed to 
1 . 
a
αθ
θ −
 is decreasing in θ .  
Define an increasing function ( ) ah θθ
θ
−
= . Let ( ) ah θα θ
θ
−
= = . ( ) ( )g gα θ α θ= > =  is 
ensured by the fact that ( ) 0g θ′ > .  Since 1
a
αθ
θ
=
−
, ( ) ( )Iη θ α θ−  is non-decreasing on [ , ]θ θ  for 
any [ ,1)α α∈ . 
When ( , )α α α∈ , there exists 1( )
1
ahθ α θ
α
−= = <
−
  such that ( ) ( )Iη θ α θ−  is non-
decreasing on  [ , ]θ θ ,  and is non-increasing on ( , ]θ θ ;  
A useful result that facilitates our analysis is that 1 1( ) ( )h gα α− −>  for any ( , )α α α∈ , 
which follows the fact that ( )h θ  is smaller than ( )g θ  for any θ  less than θ .  Thereafter, for 
any ( , )α α α∈ , there always exists an interval 1 1( ( ), ( ))g hα α− −  over which the constraint is slack 
for the benchmark solution. 
 
Proof of Lemma 3: 
The proof proceeds in two steps.  First, we show that full separation is no longer optimal.  
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Suppose on the contrary, i.e. full separation is still optimal, we should have 
( ) 1 2 0a p pθ θ− + =  over [ , ]θ θ . Governed by 0u < , the participation constraint can only bind 
at θ . For a given ( , )α α α∈ , ( ) ( ) 0Iη θ α θ− ≥  is slack on ( , ]θ θ ; otherwise, the participation 
constraint is violated in a neighborhood of θ , because ( ) / ( ) aI θη θ θ α
θ
−
= < . So 2 ( )λ θ  is 
constant on ( , ]θ θ . Using 2λ  to denote the constant value of 2 ( )λ θ  on ( , ]θ θ , we obtain: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )21 2 2
( ) 11( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 0  ( , ]
( )
F v
a p p a I v v b v f v dv a
a f v
θ
θ
α λ
θ θ θ θ η θ α λ θ θθ
  − − 
 − + = − − − + + − − =        
∀ ∈∫
which implies 
( ) 2* * ( ) 11( ) ( )
( )
F
I b
a f
θ α λ
θ η θ θ
θ
 − − 
− = − +  
 
 and 2 0λ =  (because of 1
a
θ
α
>
−
 for 
( , )α α α∈ ) over [ , ]θ θ . 
Hence, * 2
( )( ) 0
( )
a Fu
a f
θ θθ θ
θ
′ −
= − + < 
 
, the same as the benchmark case; so is { }* *( ), ( )I θ η θ  
(because the participation constraint also binds at θ as it does in the benchmark case). A 
contradiction is derived.  In addition, for [ ,1)α α∈ , only purely bunching menu can be sustained. 
Second, we show that the principal’s optimal menu will exhibit bunching at most on an 
interval at the bottom of the type space. 
Suppose that ( , ) [ , ]θ θ θ θ′ ′′ ⊂  is the first interval from below over which the optimal 
allocation is full separation (define θ ′ as { }*inf : ( ) 0 for all t u tθ θ θ θ′ ′′= < < <  and θ ′′  as 
{ }*sup : ( ) 0 for all t u tθ θ θ θ′′ ′= < < < ).   
Because *u  is discontinuous at θ ′  and θ ′′ , 2 ( )λ θ  is continuous at the two points, so is 
( ) 1 2( ) ( )a p pθ θθ θ− +  from equation (15). Hence we obtain ( ) 1 2 0( ) ( )a p pθ θθ θ− + = on [ , ]θ θ′ ′′ . 
( ) ( )Iη θ α θ≥  is slack over ( , )θ θ′ ′′ , implying that 2 ( )λ θ  is constant over ( , )θ θ′ ′′ .  We use 2λ  to 
denote the constant value of 2 ( )λ θ  on ( , )θ θ′ ′′ , and show that θ ′′  should coincide with θ .  
Since ( ) 1 2 0( ) ( )a p pθ θθ θ− + =  over ( , )θ θ′ ′′ ,  
( ) 2( ) 11( ) ( )   ( , )
( )
F
I b
a f
θ α λ
θ η θ θ θ θ θ
θ
− − 
′ ′′− = − + ∀ ∈ 
 
.  
It is equivalent to have 
( )* 2
2
( ) 1
( )
( )
Fau
a f
θ α λθθ θ
θ θ
− − − ∂
= − + ∂  
 on ( , )θ θ′ ′′ . Lemma A2 
shows that given ( ) 20 1 1α λ< − ≤ (by equation (9)), 
( ) 2( ) 1 0
( )
F
f
θ α λ
θ
θ θ
− − ∂
+ > ∂  
holds on the 
entire type space.  
Next, we show that if θ ′′  is different from θ , ( ) ( )Iη θ α θ≥  cannot bind at θ ′′ .  Suppose 
otherwise that ( ) ( )Iη θ α θ=  at θ ′′ , θ ′′ should rest on the non-increasing region of ( ) ( )Iη θ α θ− , 
implying 
1
aθ
α
′′ >
−
 .  Because ( , )α α α∈ , ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) 0
1
aaI I Iθ θ θ η θ α θ θ
α
 
− − = − − < 
− 
 on 
[ , ]θ θ′′ , i.e. the participation constraint is violated. 
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Therefore, ( ) ( )Iη θ α θ≥  should remain slack on [ , ]θ θ′′ , and 2 ( )λ θ  is constant over 
( , ]θ θ′ . Bunching till θ  is sustained by ( ) 1 2( ) ( ) 0a p pθ θ θ θ− + >  on [ , ]θ θ′′ . Then it is obtained: 
( )( )
( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1 2
2 2
2
2 2
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) 11 ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) 1 ( ) 11 ( )
( ) ( )
p b I v v f v dv
a
b I v v f v dv
a
F v
b v I v v f v dv
a f v
F F v
v f v dv
a f f v
θ
θ
θ
θ
θ
θ
θ η θλ θ λ θ
θ θ α λ λ
η
α λ
η
θ α λ α λ
θ
θ
′′
′′
= − − − −
− − +
= − − −
 − − 
= − + − −     
 ′′ − − − −   
′′= + − +     ′′    
∫
∫
∫
0
θ
θ
<∫
 
The first equality follows equation(16); the second equality follows 
( ) 1 2 0( ) ( )a p pθ θ θ θ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′− + = ; and the last inequality follows Lemma A2.  Hence the 
transversality conditions are violated. 
Combining these two steps, we complete the proof for Lemma 3. □ 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: 
From Lemma 3, the principal bunches the low-end of the type space  [ , ]θ θ ′  .  θ ′  here plays a similar role 
that θˆ  does in the main text.  Equation (4.2) is derived from ( ) 1 2 0( ) ( )a p pθ θ θ θ′ ′ ′ ′− + = , and equation 
(4.3) results from the binding of the participation constraint at θ  and the binding of the minimum 
preservation constraint on [ , ]θ θ ′ . 
According to equation (4.2), ( )
( )
2ˆ( )1 ˆ( )ˆ ˆ( ) ˆ1 ( )
F
a Ff
f
θα λ
θθ θ
α θ
− =
 
− + − 
. 
( ) ( )
( )
ˆ
1ˆ ˆ( ) 1 ( ) 0ˆ( )ˆ
ˆ1 ( )
a
F F
a F
f
θ
α
θ α λ θ
θθ
α θ
 
− − − − = ≥
 
− +  − 
 follows 
( )
ˆ 0
1
a θ
α
− ≥
−
 by equation (4.3).□ 
Proof of Corollary 1: 
1. According to the implicit function theorem, the following two equations are derived from 
equations (4.2) and (4.3): 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ( ) 1( ) ( )ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1 1 ( ) 0ˆ ˆ ( )( ) ( )
FF F a F
ff f
θ α λθ θ λ θθ λ α θ α θ θ
α θ αθ θ
 ′     − −∂ ∂ − + − + − − − + =       ′∂ ∂       
 
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )2
2ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) 1 1 ( )ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ1 1 ( )( ) ( )
ˆ( ) 11ˆ ˆ 0ˆ ˆ1 ( )( ) ( )1
Fa a f dv
f vf f
Fa adv b
f v af f
θ
θ
θ
θ
θ α λ αθ θ λθ θ θ
α α α αθ θ
θ α λλ λθ θ
αθ θα
′
 ′      − − −∂ ∂ − + + − +        − ∂ − ∂         
    − −
+ − − − − + =      − −    
∫
∫
 
which can be reduced to 
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( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
2
ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ1 ( ) 1 ( )ˆ ˆ
ˆ 1 ( )( )
ˆˆ ˆ( ) 11 ( ) 1 ( )ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( )
F a F dv
a f vf
Fa F a a Fdv b b
f v a af f f
θ
θ
θ
θ
α θ α λ θ θθ θ
α αθ
θ α λλ θ θθ θ θ
α α αθ θ θ
′
 ′     − − − ∂  + − +      − ∂      
       − −
= + − + − + − +           − − −        
∫
∫
Hence we can conclude that 
ˆ
0θ
α
∂
>
∂
. 
It can also be verified that 1ˆ ( )θ θ α− =  and 1ˆ ( ) aθθ θ α
θ
− −= =  from equations (4.2) and 
(4.3). 
When α α> , the whole type space would be bunched with P PIα η= . The participation 
constraint ( ) ( )1 0
1
P P P PaaI I Iθ η α θ
α
 − − = − − > − 
 on the entire type space. 
The principal’s objective then becomes ( ) ( )( )211 1 ( )
2
P P Pb I I I f d
θ
θ
α α θ θ − − − − 
 ∫
. The 
first-order condition gives the solution presented in the second part of this corollary. □ 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 4: 
The proof of this proposition consists of several arguments. First, we show that ( ) | 0SW α αα =′ =  and 
( ) | 0SW α αα =′′ > .  They imply that an effective intervention on the preservation ratio is a social welfare-
improving strategy; for [ , )α α α∈ , the first-order derivative of the social planner’s objective w.r.t. α : 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) 1 ( ) 11 1 ( )ˆ ˆ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ( ) ( )
ˆ1 ( ) 1 1 ( ) 11 1 1ˆ ( )ˆ ˆ ( )( ) ( )
F F dSW f d
a a a df f
F F
f d
a a a a a ff f
θ
θ
θ
θ
θ α λ θ α λ θ θ αα θ θ θ θ
αθ θ
α θ α λ α θ α λθθ θ θ
θθ θ
  ′     − − − −  ′  = − + + −                 
  − − − − − − 
 + + − +         
∫
∫
( ) ( )
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
( )
ˆ( ) 1 ( ) 11 1 1ˆ ( )ˆ ˆ ( )( ) ( )
dd
d
F F
f d d
a a a a a ff f
θ
θ
θ θ
θ θ
λ αθ
α
θ α λ θ α λλ θ λθ θ θ θ
θθ θ
 
 
  
  − − − − 
 − + − −         
∫
∫ ∫
 
Substitute ˆ( )θ α θ=   and ( ) 0λ α =  into this expression, we obtain ( ) 0SW α′ = . 
After substituting 
ˆ( )d
d
θ α
α
 and  
( )d
d
λ α
α
 with their respective values, the first-order derivatives can 
be simplified as 
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( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
ˆ
ˆ
2
2
ˆ
ˆ ˆ( ) 1 ( ) 11 1ˆ ˆ ˆ( )ˆ ˆ1 1 ( )( ) ( )1
ˆ ˆ( ) (1ˆ ˆ ˆ( )
1 ( ) 1
F Fa aa f d b dv
a f vf f
a F Faa dv F bf v a
θ θ
θ θ
θ
θ
θ α λ θ α λ
θ θ θ θ θ θ λ
α αθ θα
θ θθ θ θ
α α
          − − − −     − + − − + − +             − −       −      
  
 − + + − + − −   
∫ ∫
∫
( )
( )
( )
ˆ
) 1 ( ) 1ˆ
ˆ 1 ( )( )
Fa d
ff
θ
θ
α λ θ α λ
λ θ θ
α θθ
 
 
  
 
     − − − −    − −           −         
∫
with 
the term in the outmost bracket equals to 0 at α α= .  Further, differentiating ( )SW α′  w.r.t. α  and 
evaluating its value at α α=  yield 
( ) ( )
2
2
3
4
( )( )
( )( ) 0
2 1
1
Fa f b d
a fSW
a
θ
θ
θ θθ θ
θα
α θ
α
 − 
 ′′ = >
 
− − − 
∫
. 
Second, we show that ( ) | 0SW
α α
α +=′ <  and ( ) 0SW α′′ <  on [ ,1)α α∈ ; that is, the social planner 
prefers the corner solution among all purely-bunching menus; the result can be easily derived by 
substituting 
( ) ( )
1 1
1 1
BI b
α α
 
= −  − − 
 into the social planner’s objective for [ ,1)α α∈ , and differentiating it 
w.r.t. α . 
Third, we show that ( ) | 0SW
α α
α −=′ < ; that is, the social planner’s prefers a partially-separating 
market outcome. For [ , )α α α∈ , 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
ˆ
ˆ
2
ˆ
2
ˆ ˆ ˆ
( )
ˆ( ) 11 ( )ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )ˆ1 ( ) 1( )1
ˆ( ) ( ) 1ˆ ˆ ( )
1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( )
SW
Fa F aa b F d F d
a ff
a F a Fa dv d d F d
f v f f
θ θ
θ θ
θ θ θ
θ θ θ θ
α
θ α λ θθ θ θ θ θ θ
α θ αθα
θ θθ λ θ θ λ θ θ θ
α α θ θ
′
      − −   − + − −       − −−      =
    
 − + − − −    − −     
∫ ∫
∫ ∫ ∫
( )
( )ˆ( ) 11 ˆ
ˆ1 ( )
F
b
a fθ
θ α λλ θ
α θ
 
 
    − −
 − − +     −     
    
∫
 
When  aθα α
θ
−
→ =  from below, 
( )
2
ˆ
ˆ( )ˆ 0
1 ( )
a F dv
f v
θ
θ
θθ
α
 
− + →  − 
∫  as well as  
( )
( )
( )
( )
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ ˆ
ˆ( ) 11 ( )ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )ˆ1 ( ) 1( )
0
( ) 1ˆ ( )
1 ( ) ( )
Fa F ab F d F d
a ff
a F d d F d
f f
θ θ
θ θ
θ θ θ
θ θ θ
θ α λ θθ θ θ θ θ θ
α θ αθ
θλ θ θ λ θ θ θ
α θ θ
       − −    − + − −       − −       → 
   − − −     −    
∫ ∫
∫ ∫ ∫
. 
Moreover, 
ˆd
d
θ
α
→∞ .  According to L'Hôpital's rule, 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ ˆ
2
ˆ( ) 11 ( )ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )ˆ ( ) 1( )
1 1( ) 1ˆ ( )
1 ( ) ( )
lim ( )
1
1
F F ab F d F d
a ffd
d a F d d F d
a f a f
SW
d a
d
θ θ
θ θ
θ θ θ
θ θ θ
α α
θ α λ θθ θ θ θ θ θ
θ αθ
α α αθλ θ θ λ θ θ θ
α θ θ
α
α
α α
−→
       − −   − + − −        −       
  − −  − − −    −    ′ =
− −
−
∫ ∫
∫ ∫ ∫
( )
( )
2
ˆ
ˆ( ) 11 ˆ
ˆ1 ( )ˆ( )ˆ
( )
F
b
a fF dv
f v
θ
θ
θ α λλ θ
α θθθ
  − −
 − − +   −        +  
     
∫
  
The nominator of the first term equals as α α −→ : 
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( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ ˆ
ˆ( ) 11 ( )ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )ˆ ( ) 1( )
1 1( ) 1ˆ ( )
1 ( ) ( )
ˆ( ) ( )0
1
F F ab F d F d
a ffd
d a F d d F d
a f a f
d d a
d d
θ θ
θ θ
θ θ θ
θ θ θ
θ α λ θθ θ θ θ θ θ
θ αθ
α α αθλ θ θ λ θ θ θ
α θ θ
θ α λ α
α α
       − −    − + − −        −       
  − −  − − −     −    
= + −
−
∫ ∫
∫ ∫ ∫
( )2
( )b F d
a
θ
θ
θ θ θ
α
 
− 
 
∫
 
The denominator of the first term equals as α α −→ : 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
2
2 2
2ˆ ˆ
2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ ˆ1 2 2 1 1 2ˆ1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1( ) 1
ˆ( ) ( )1
( )
a f F d a F a adv dv
f v d f vf
F d
f d
θ θ
θ θ
θ θ θ α θα θ α θ α θ
α α α αθ α
θ θ αα
θ α
         
 − − − + − − − − + + − −            − − −  −            
 
= − − 
 
∫ ∫
 
Then
( ) ( )2
1 1lim ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0
1
SW b f F d F d
a a
θ θ
θ θα α
θα θ θ θ θ θ
α−→
   ′ = − − + <  
−    
∫ ∫ . 
These intermediate results together establish that the optimal degree of intervention lies on ( , )α α , 
inducing a partially-separating menu as the market outcome. □ 
 
Maximum Information-Acquisition Policy  
To investigate how the presence of an upper bound on information acquisition affects the vendor’s optimal 
allocations, we again apply the Lagrange multiplier 2 ( )λ θ  to the inequality presented in equation (4.5).  
The corresponding Hamiltonian-Lagrangian changes to ( ) ( )1 2 1 2, , , , , , ( ) ( )L I u p p H I ua
θ
η λ θ λ θ η θ λ
θ
≡ + − +
−
. 
The necessary conditions remain the same as in the benchmark case except that *1 1 1p p θλ= +  and 
( )*2 2 1 2p p a θ λ λ= + − − .  Accordingly, the counterpart of equation (14) is 
( )( ){ }
( ){ } ( )
1 1 1
2 1 1 2
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
p b I v v f v v dv
p I v v b f v v dv a
θ
θ
θ
θ
θ η λ θλ θ
θ η λ θ λ θ λ θ
 = − − + −

 = − − + − + − +

∫
∫
. 
Analogously, we can derive some intermediate results that help characterize the optimal menu 
based on the necessary conditions. Particularly,  
 ( ) 1 2 1 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )a p p a I v v b f v v dva
θ
θ
θθ θ θ θ η λ θλ θ
   − + = − − − − +      
∫  (17) 
Moreover, the transversality conditions imply 2 11 ( ) ( ) 0aλ θ λ θ+ = > , suggesting that the 
participation constraint should bind on optimality. 
 
Proof of Lemma 4: 
The proof proceeds in two steps. First, we show that full separation is no longer optimal when 
( )K I θ<  .  
Suppose on the contrary, i.e. full separation is still optimal, we should have 
( ) 1 2 0a p pθ θ− + =  over [ , ]θ θ . Governed by 0u < , ( )I Kθ ≤  can only bind at θ , implying that 
2 ( )λ θ  is constant on ( , ]θ θ . Using 2λ  to denote the constant value of 2 ( )λ θ  on ( , ]θ θ , we 
obtain: 
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( ) 1 2 2 ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )a p p b a
a I v v f v dv
θ
θ
θθ θ λ θθ θ η θ  − + −  
  
= − − +∫  
2
2 ( , ]( )1( ) ( ) ( ) 0    
( )
F va I v v b v f v dv
a f v
θ
θ
λ θ θλη θ θ
    
        
+= − − − + + = ∀ ∈∫ , 
which implies * * 2
1 ( )( ) ( )
( )
FI b
a f
θ λθ η θ θ
θ
 +
− = − + 
 
 and 2 0λ =  over [ , ]θ θ . 
Hence, * 2
( )( ) 0
( )
a Fu
a f
θ θθ θ
θ
′ −
= − + < 
 
, the same as in the benchmark case; so is 
{ }* *( ), ( )I θ η θ  (because the participation constraint also binds at θ as it does in the benchmark 
case). A contradiction is derived because *( ) ( )I I Kθ θ= > .  
Second, we show that the principal’s optimal menu will exhibit bunching at most on an 
interval at the bottom of the type space. 
Suppose that ( , ) [ , ]θ θ θ θ′ ′′ ⊂  is the first interval from below over which the optimal 
allocation is full separation (define θ ′ as { }*inf : ( ) 0 for all t u tθ θ θ θ′ ′′= < < <  and θ ′′  as 
{ }*sup : ( ) 0 for all t u tθ θ θ θ′′ ′= < < < ).  Because *u  is discontinuous at θ ′ , 2 ( )λ θ  is continuous at 
this point, so is ( ) 1 2( ) ( )a p pθ θθ θ− +  from equation (17). Hence we should have 
( ) 1 2( ) ( ) 0a p pθ θ θ θ′ ′ ′ ′− + = . Moreover, given that ( ) 1 2 0( ) ( )a p pθ θθ θ− + =  on ( , )θ θ′ ′′  and 2 ( )λ θ  
is constant over ( , ]θ θ′ , our aim is to show that θ ′′  should coincide with θ .  
Since ( ) 1 2 0( ) ( )a p pθ θθ θ− + =  over ( , )θ θ′ ′′ , 
21 ( )( ) ( )   ( , )
( )
FI b
a f
θ λθ η θ θ θ θ θ
θ
 + ′ ′′− = − + ∀ ∈ 
 
.  
Hence on ( , )θ θ′ ′′ , * 22
( )( )
( )
a Fu
a f
θ θ λθ θ
θ θ
 − ∂ +
= − + ∂  
 and 2
( ) 0
( )
F
f
θ λθ
θ θ
 ∂ +
+ > ∂  
 (by the 
definition of ( , )θ θ′ ′′ ). From Lemma A2, we know that 2( )
( )
F
f
θ λθ
θ θ
 ∂ +
+ ∂    
remains positive for 
all values of θ  larger than θ ′′ .  
Therefore, if θ ′′  is different from θ , and 
21 ( )( ) ( )
( )
FI b
a f
θ λθ η θ θ
θ
  +
− − − +  
    
starts to 
become positive from θ +′′  , it remains so until θ  (because * 0u =  afterwards).  We rewrite the 
expression of 1( )p θ  as follows: 
( )1 1( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( )p b I v v f v dv
θ
θ
θ η θλ θ= − − −∫
 
 
( )( ) 21 2
1 1 ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
F va p p I b v f v dv
a a f v
θ
θ
λθ θ θ θ θ η θ
′′
   + ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′= − − + − − − − +   
    
∫  
21 ( )( ) ( ) ( ) 0
( )
F vI b v f v dv
a f v
θ
θ
λθ η θ
′′
   + ′′ ′′= − − − − + <   
    
∫  
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The second equation follows from the fact that ( ) 1 2( ) ( ) 0a p pθ θ θ θ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′− + = , and the last 
inequality follows from the fact that 2 2( ) ( )
( ) ( )
F F
f f
θ λ θ λθ θ
θ θ
′′+ +′′+ > +
′′  
over ( , ]θ θ′′ .  It contradicts 
the transversality conditions that 1( ) 0p θ = .
 
Hence, θ ′′  should coincide with θ , indicating that 
bunching can only occur for the lower interval of the type space, i.e. [ , ]θ θ ′ . 
Combining these two steps, we complete the proof for Lemma 4. □ 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 5: 
From Lemma 4, the principal bunches the low-end of the type space  [ , ]θ θ ′  (here again, θ ′  refers to the 
same concept as θˆ  in the main text does).  Equation (4.6) is derived from ( ) 1 2 0( ) ( )a p pθ θ θ θ′ ′ ′ ′− + = , and 
equation (4.7) results from the binding of the participation constraint at θ  and the binding of the 
information boundary constraint on [ , ]θ θ ′ . □ 
 
Proof of Corollary 2: 
1. According to the implicit function theorem, the following two equations are derived from 
equations (4.6) and (4.7): 
ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) 0ˆ ˆ( ) ( )
F FF
K Kf f
θ λ θ θ λθ θ θ
θ θ
′   + ∂ ∂
− + + − =   
∂ ∂   
,  
and  
ˆ( )
ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) 1ˆ ˆ 1ˆ ˆ ( )( ) ( ) K
F d
K f Kf f
θ
θ
θ λ θ θ λθ θ θ
θθ θ
′   + ∂ ∂
− + − + =   
∂ ∂   
∫ . 
From them, 
2
ˆ( )
ˆ( )ˆ
ˆˆ ( )
ˆ( ) 1ˆ ˆ ˆ( )ˆ ( )( ) K
F
f
K F F d
ff
θ
θ
θθ
θθ
θ λθ θ θ θ
θθ
 
− − 
∂  =
∂ ′   +
+ +   
  
∫
. 
It can be verified that both the denominator and the nominator are positive 
(
2ˆ( ) 0ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )
F
f F
θλ
θ θ θ
= >
−
 from equation (4.6) and the definition of λ ). 
2.  From equation (4.6) and the definition of λ , ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) 0f Fθ θ θ− > .   
If ( ) ( ) 0f Fθ θ θ− >  on the entire type space, ( )inf : 0
( )
F
f
θθ θ
θ
 
∅ = − = 
 
, and the upper bound of 
ˆ( )Kθ  is θ .  We shall demonstrate that if ( ) ( ) 0f Fθ θ θ− ≤  at some [ , ]θ θ θ∈ , ( ) ( ) 0f Fθ θ θ− ≤  
on the remaining type space, i.e. ( , ]θ θ . 
 First, the first-order derivative of ( ) ( )f Fθ θ θ−  is [ ]( ) ( ) ( )d f F f
d
θ θ θ θ θ
θ
′− = .  It implies 
that the monotonicity of ( ) ( )f Fθ θ θ−  is the same as that of ( )f θ : it first starts with a non-
decreasing interval, and then is reversed to be non-increasing after some tipping point (this is 
due to the unimodality of ( )f θ ).  Since ( ) ( ) 0f Fθ θ θ− > , ( ) ( )f Fθ θ θ−  equals to 0 only on its 
non-increasing interval.  The result follows directly from the uni-modality of the density 
function.  
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 Moreover, equation (4.6) implies that 0ˆ
d
d
λ
θ
>  on [ , )θ θ , and increases to infinity when θˆ  
approaches to θ . Therefore, for a log-concave distribution with { }inf : ( ) ( ) 0f Fθ θ θ θ θ− = <  
satisfied, the bunching region never extends beyond 
( )inf : 0
( )
F
f
θθ θ θ
θ
 
≡ − = 
 
  for any arbitrarily 
low boundary (this assertion also requires full participation on optimality, i.e., *( ) 0I θ >  for all 
[ , ]θ θ θ∈ ).  As a consequence, a θ  belonging to the top interval of the support cannot be an 
eligible candidate for θˆ .  
 
 
Proof of Proposition 6: 
For the set of partially-separating menus, we can show that  
ˆ( )
ˆ( )
2
ˆ( )
( )
ˆ1 1 1 ( ) 1 ( )ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) 0ˆ ( )1 ( )ˆ ˆ( )
( )
K
K
K
SW K
F Ff d F f d
a a a a f afF d
f
θ θ
θ θθ
θ
θ λ θ θ λ θθ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ
θθθ θ θ
θ
′
      + +
= + − + + − >                + 
 
∫ ∫
∫
 
for any ( )K I θ<  . 
For the set of pure-bunching menus, again ( ) 0SW K′ > . □ 
 
